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Dilemmas Of Community Planning: Lessons From Scotland 
 
Abstract 
Community Planning Partnerships (CPPs) are a central feature of a programme of 
local government modernisation and public service reform in Scotland. CPPs are 
intended to ensure that local authorities, other local public agencies, the voluntary, 
community and private sectors develop a shared vision for their area and work in 
partnership to implement this. CPPs therefore have much in common with similar 
initiatives in other parts of the UK, such as communities strategies, Local Strategic 
Partnerships, and proposals contained in the 2007 Local Government and Public 
Involvement in Health Bill in England. This article discusses how the development of 
CPPs relates to devolution in Scotland. It identifies systemic dilemmas, if not 
contradictions, encountered in implementing community planning in Scotland. 
Tensions exist reconciling partnership working with local authority leadership; 
between community planning as an additional or core duty of public agencies; 
between community engagement and the practical demands of policy-making; and 
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The term ‘community planning’ has various meanings. Its most general sense refers to 
methods of public engagement and participation in local planning, particularly public 
involvement in local environment planning (DCLG, nd). A more specific meaning 
refers to the development of joint strategies and partnership working between local 
agencies (IdeA, nd). In Scotland, more emphasis has been attached to this second 
meaning: community planning (CP) north of the border refers to a statutory 
Community Planning Partnership (CPP), comprising the local authority, the other 
local public service providers, and representatives from the voluntary, community and 
private sectors. The Community Planning Working Group (CPWG) established by the 
pre-devolution Scottish Office and Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
(COSLA) in 1997, proposed three aims for CP: to improve local services through co-
ordinated working between local public service providers; to establish a process 
through which public agencies and the voluntary, community and private sectors 
could agree a strategic vision for their area and the measures to implement this; and to 
create a means through which the views of communities could be identified and 
delivered in policy (Scottish Office, 1998: para 7). The statutory guidance issued by 
the post-devolution Scottish Executive set out two further principles for CP: that CPPs 
should become the overarching partnership coordinating other initiatives within a 
locality, and CPPs would become a principal connection between national and local 
priorities and policies (Scottish Executive, 2004a). 
 
CP in Scotland represents an important experiment in organisational integration and 
community involvement, but it is far from a unique development in the UK. Multi-
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agency local partnerships are a common feature in the changing landscape of local 
governance in each of the four UK nations. For example, the Local Government Act, 
2000 required local authorities in England to produce a community strategy, similar to 
the community plans required of Scottish CPPs, and Local Strategic Partnerships 
(LSPs) have become an important mechanism for the coordination of local services 
(Bound and Skidmore, 2005). In Wales, Community Strategy Partnerships and the 
Community First programme resemble other aspects of CPPs, such as partnership 
working and community engagement (Welsh Assembly Government, 2006); and in 
November 2005 it was announced that Local Strategy Partnerships in Northern 
Ireland were to be developed into CPPs along Scottish lines (Blake Stevenson and 
Stratagem, 2005). ‘Community planning contains the seeds of a fundamental change 
in the ways of working at a local level’ (IdeA, nd). CP in Scotland has developed in 
parallel to and shares many features with similar local governance reforms elsewhere 
in the UK, and the Scottish experience is relevant both to these and comparable 
developments outside the UK (McKinlay, 2006). These parallel reforms include 
developing joint local decision- and policy-making processes, delivering ‘seamless’ 
and customer-centred public services; debates over new localism and ‘double 
devolution’; the duties of local authority councillors, the role of the voluntary, 
community and private sectors in local governance, and other measures contained in 
the Local Government and Public Involvement Bill in England. 
 
However, the institutional and political culture in Scotland provides a distinctive 
background to this shared agenda. This article discusses the development of CP in 
Scotland and outlines some of the challenges encountered in implementing this new 
local governance partnership. This experience is related to the broader context of 
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devolution introduced in Scotland in 1999. The paper considers whether devolution 
has led to a divergence from parallel local governance reforms elsewhere in the UK, 
and given CP ‘a distinctive Scottish flavour’ as a result  (Lloyd et al, 2001, p. 19). 
The discussion draws upon analysis of the numerous policy proposals, thinkpieces, 
commentaries and evaluations which have accompanied the development of CP in 
Scotland (e.g. Scottish Office, 1998; Stevenson, 2002; Audit Scotland, 2006). This is 
supplemented with findings from a pilot research study of the experience of 
partnership working in one case study CPP in Scotland. This project involved semi-
structured interviews with the main CPP participants and other local voluntary, 
community and private sector stakeholders. 
 
 
The Development Of Community Planning in Scotland 
 
The statutory requirement to establish CPPs in all 32 local authority areas in Scotland 
was the most significant local governance reform introduced by the Scottish 
Executive in the second session of the Scottish Parliament, 2003-07. The Local 
Government in Scotland (LGiS) Act, 2003 made the creation and maintenance of 
CPPs a local authority responsibility, and participation in Partnerships a duty of the 
other main local public agencies: Health, Police and Fire service joint boards, Scottish 
/ Highland and Island Enterprise, and regional transport partnerships. It also imposed 
a duty upon Scottish Executive Ministers to ‘promote and encourage’ CP (Carley, 
2005, p. 59).  
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To understand the evolution of CP in Scotland it is important to be aware of the 
context in which it developed. Firstly, CP should be seen in relation to a wider 
programme of local government modernisation and public service reform undertaken 
by the previous Scottish Executive (i.e. the Labour - Liberal Democrat coalition in 
office until the May 2007 Scottish Parliamentary elections). The Scottish Executive’s 
‘vision of public service reform’, Transforming Public Services (2006a) related CP to 
a range of measures, including efficiency savings - developing upon the UK 
government’s Gershon review of public sector efficiency and service reform (2004) 
and the Executive's own version of this, Building A Better Scotland (Scottish 
Executive, 2004b) - ‘streamlining bureaucracy’, rationalising government funding 
streams, encouraging the sharing of back office services within the public sector and 
shared service delivery mechanisms, rolling out the Best Value process across the 
public sector, and mainstreaming community engagement into local policy making. 
 
Secondly, CP should be seen in relation to the institutional and cultural context of 
Scottish politics. The re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 (after it was 
prorogued in 1707 following the Treaty of Union with England) is only one aspect of 
this context. The Scottish Parliament and Executive were not reintroduced in 1999 
upon a ‘blank slate’ but added to existing systems of institutional and administrative 
devolution; most notably distinctive legal, education and local government systems 
which had sustained separate identities and policies from Whitehall (McConnell, 
2005; Keating, 2005). Therefore, if there is any distinctive ‘tartan tone’ to CP or local 




Certain other features of Scottish politics also influenced the development of local 
governance reform and CP. Among these is the small scale of the political community 
and the ‘village-life’ quality which results from the shared experiences, close 
proximity, and inter-penetrating networks which characterise Scotland (Jeffrey, 2006, 
p.61). For example, 36% of the 129 Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) 
elected in 2003 had previously been local authority councillors, which creates a 
familiarity between the levels of government and intensity of association not possible 
in England with almost 400 local authorities and over 650 Westminster MPs 
(McAteer and Bennett, 2005, p. 297). One outcome of this has been a more 
consultative and cooperative policy style, in which relations between central and local 
government are more negotiated than confrontational (Keating, 2003). Some 
commentators argue that such consensualism engenders conservatism in policy and 
inhibits radical change (Gallagher, 2007). According to this perspective, what has 
been distinctive about policy in Scotland, including local governance reform, is 
neither its substance nor outcomes but the form in which it is developed and 
introduced. Although some significant policy reforms have been introduced in 
Scotland since devolution (most notably in relation to student university fees, and 
funding long-term care for elderly people), these have been neither as frequent nor 
different as some anticipated (Mooney and Scott, 2006). Indeed, some of the most 
notable departures in Scottish policy from those in England since devolution have 
resulted from the Scottish Executive’s reluctance to replicate innovations introduced 
by Whitehall - a tendency Scotland has shared with the Welsh Assembly Government 
- rather than through pioneering its own new policies (Adams and Schmuecker, 2006). 
One effect of these conditions in relation to local governance reform is that the 
Scottish Executive has developed a more inclusive performance regime in partnership 
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with public service agencies. The Scottish Executive did not adopt the level of 
regulation and scrutiny favoured, until recently, in England. For example, there have 
been no Comprehensive Performance Assessments (CPAs) nor league tables for local 
authorities, and fewer performance indicators. There has been less emphasis on 
setting targets, and continuing reliance upon local government as a provider of 
services. The central element of monitoring local government performance in 
Scotland are triennial Best Value Audits undertaken by Audit Scotland, which have 
the ostensible purpose of assisting rather than ranking performance, although some 
local authorities have found themselves ‘named and shamed’ for poor performance by 
the Auditors (Audit Scotland, 2007).  
 
Reflecting this culture of cooperation, the Scottish Executive was deliberately non-
prescriptive and did not specify in detail how CPPs should operate, arguing that ‘what 
is appropriate will depend on local circumstances’ (Scottish Executive, 2006b). 
Inevitably this has lead to variation in their format and operation, so that it is 
necessary to be cautious in generalising about their overall performance and impact. 
Nevertheless, while acknowledging this, it is possible to identify a number of 
recurring issues from the various analyses of CP which have been undertaken. 
 
 
Dilemmas Of Community Planning 
 
There has been debate in England over the extent to which the succession of reforms 
referred to as the local government modernisation agenda amount to a coherent set of 
policies (Downe and Martin, 2006). Although fewer and less frequent, a similar 
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question can be asked about parallel local governance reforms in Scotland. CP in 
Scotland itself entails systemic dilemmas, if not contradictions, as Offe (1984) uses 
these terms. Contradictions are fundamental structural incompatibilities within a 
system of government and arise when actions to remedy problems undermine the very 
basis of that system. Contradictions are irresolvable and lead to crises in which the 
reproduction of the entire structure is imperilled. Less severely, a dilemma describes a 
situation involving a choice between alternative courses of action that are mutually 
exclusive or equally unfavourable. Whereas a contradiction cannot be resolved, a 
dilemma can be ‘solved or managed by a circumspect balancing of the two 
components’ but only at the expense of sub-optimal performance of either or both 
options (Offe, 1982, p. 11). 
 
Such dilemmas and tensions exist between the different aims set for CP and 
aspirations attached to CPPs in Scotland. While these dilemmas do not threaten the 
survival of CP, they comprise its performance by requiring Partnerships to juggle 
conflicting duties which cannot be reconciled. Of course, all complex organisations 
involve coping with multiple responsibilities and inevitably entail trade-offs between 
competing goals. What makes CP especially interesting is that it involves multi-
agency partnerships comprising organisations with different remits, responsibilities 
and resources attempting to co-ordinate sometimes competing duties and tasks, so that 
dilemmas and trade-offs are more conspicuous. For example, an evaluation of the 
initial five CP pathfinders launched in 1998 concluded that they had some significant 
successes, given the short period they had operated (Rogers, et al, 2000). However, 
this evaluation also identified tensions in the operation of CPPs. These included that 
between agreeing a shared strategic vision, establishing the processes to implement 
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this, and translating these processes into joint actions and outcomes. A second tension 
involved reconciling the respective requirements of partnership working, community 
involvement and the local authority’s community leadership role. These inherent 
tensions remain unresolved.  
 
A review of initial CP progress reports concluded that among the key issues for the 
successful future development of CP were:  
 
i. unequivocal Scottish Executive and Scottish Parliament support for CP  
ii. the need to rationalise existing local partnerships and revise national policies 
responsible for these 
iii. establishing a clearer role for voluntary, private and community sectors 
representatives 
iv. developing joint resourcing of key CP activities (COSLA, 2000). 
 
Although subsequent analyses indicate that progress has been made on some of these 
matters, nevertheless several remain relevant and unresolved (Carley, 2004; Scottish 
Parliament Audit Committee, 2007). Their persistence reflects four dilemmas at the 
heart of CP as this operates in Scotland, each of which is discussed in turn; i.e. 
tensions between: 
 
• partnership working and local authority leadership 
• CP as a central or an additional duty for public agencies 
• community engagement and the practical demands of policy-making 




Partnership v Leadership 
 
The requirement for local public service providers to work in partnership has been a 
consistent feature of policy throughout the UK since the late 1980s (Rummery, 2006). 
However, partnerships between agencies are likely to entail some unease and potential 
friction; it can take many months or years of sustained relationship building to 
establish the trust and mutual recognition required to operate effective multi-member 
co-ordination (DETR, 1999; Taylor, 2006). 
 
The proliferation of local policy and delivery partnerships required in recent years has 
also created problems of co-ordination and over-extension. Consequently, one of the 
initial aims of CP was ‘to help rationalise a cluttered landscape’ of local partnerships 
(Community Planning Implementation Group, 2004. p. 7). The previous Scottish 
Executive (1999-2007) suggested that its ultimate aspiration in this rationalisation 
process was the development of shared ‘back office’ services between public 
agencies, and integrated systems of service delivery (Scottish Executive, 2006c; 
Scottish Executive, 2006a). However, despite such high level commitment, three of 
the issues identified in 2000 by COSLA (i.e. ii, iii and iv above) which remain 
unresolved in many CPPs reflect the continuing practical difficulties of partnership 
working.  
 
There is a persistent dilemma in Scottish CPPs between, on the one hand, equal 
participation in policy-making and, on the other, the community leadership role 
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assumed by local authorities (Rogers et al, 2000; Lloyd et al, 2001). Leadership of CP 
was assigned to local authorities from the outset: the remit of the CPWG required it to 
have regard to councils’ status as the local focus of democratic leadership, and the 
subsequent legislation and associated guidance confirmed this role (Scottish Office, 
1998. para 2). It is significant that the LGiS Act states that while local authorities 
have a duty to initiate, maintain and facilitate CP, other public agencies only have a 
duty to participate, which inevitably results in local authorities taking responsibility 
for leading Partnerships (Phillips, 2006, p. 15). Councils’ leadership position is 
further reinforced by their ability to devote greater resources, staff and expertise to CP 
than other partners (SCVO, 2003). For example, two thirds of the 32 CPPs in 
Scotland are funded solely by local authorities, and they also chair the main executive 
boards of all CPPs and two thirds of the of lower level ‘theme’ boards within 
Partnerships (Audit Scotland, 2006, para , 92, 64). While this dominance of local 
authorities within CPPs has not lead to many occasions of outright conflict 
(Stevenson, 2002, para 3.9), nevertheless, a Partnership maintained and serviced by a 
single member ‘can affect the dynamic of decision-making’ and may be perceived ‘as 
diminishing the status of the community planning partnership as providing a balanced 
environment for decision-making’ (Phillips, 2006, p. 8). 
 
The degree of local authority dominance of the CP process varies according to local 
circumstances, e.g. the history and degree of experience of local partnership working, 
levels of trust between agencies, and the outlook of local council leaders, both elected 
and official. An evaluation of the progress of CP commissioned by Communities 
Scotland, the national regeneration and housing agency, concluded that councils at the 
‘leading edge of modernisation’, which value partnership working and citizen 
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participation, were more ready to share decision-making and avoid dominating CPPs 
(Carley, 2004). However, by definition, this leading edge includes only a small 
number of authorities and Partnerships. 
 
This dilemma reflects the wider question of legitimacy in local policy making, and 
who can claim to represent local interests. Local elected councillors, the voluntary 
sector, and community representatives may argue their respective cases for a 
legitimate mandate, and there are indications that some local councillors regard CP as 
dissipating their authority (Abram and Cowell, 2004, p. 225; Community Planning 
Network, 2005). This tension has arisen in other UK local governance reforms: the 
interim evaluation of the Communities First programme in Wales found that many 
elected councillors were uncomfortable with what they regarded as a shift towards 
participatory rather than traditional representative democracy (Welsh Assembly 
Government, 2006, para 1.2.45). Similar concerns about the mandate, role and 
responsibilities of voluntary and community sector representatives in local 
partnerships have also been noted in England (IdeA, 2006, p. 16). While some 
councillors may feel that their power is eroded by partnership decision-making, the 
expected trade-off is that CP opens up other local public agencies to greater 
democratic scrutiny and enhances the accountability of partners to each other. 
However, even this ‘democratisation’ of local policy-making is double-edged, as it 
places elected members in the ambiguous position of simultaneously shaping, 
scrutinising, and also becoming partly accountable for the policies of CP partners. 
  
CP therefore challenges previous lines of accountability, and this generates further 
tensions. There is a disjuncture within CPPs between legal, budgetary, and political 
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responsibilities for policy and the level of shared decision-making. CPPs are not 
themselves legal entities, but Partnerships have increasingly assumed responsibility or 
significant influence over policy and expenditure decisions for which individual 
partner organisations are separately legally and politically accountable (Phillips, 
2006). In such circumstances, organisations may take defensive action and retreat into 
‘organised tribalism’, where they become reluctant to share decision-making, and 
prioritise those duties which are subject to scrutiny and performance monitoring at the 
expense of working in partnership (Dalley, 1989). One possible response to this 
dilemma would be for CPPs to become ‘incorporated’ as independent legal bodies, as 
provided for by the LGiS Act. However, so far none has shown any enthusiasm for 
this option (Audit Scotland, 2006, para 37). 
  
The previous Scottish Executive stated its hope that CP will contribute to a more 
streamlined and less bureaucratic public sector (Scottish Executive, 2004b),  but there 
is no evidence that requiring organisations to work together in itself produces this 
outcome. If anything, the opposite appears more equally: consensus policy-making 
requires increased consultation, co-ordination and negotiation between participants, 
and the decision-making process can become more complex and slower as a result 
(Scottish Parliament Audit Committee, 2007, para 39). Analyses of LSPs in England 
have shown that ‘There is an ongoing tension between inclusiveness and 
effectiveness’ in policy-making (Russell, 2005 p. 51). Indeed, the complexity of joint 
governance relationships in partnerships can actually obscure the transparency of 
decision processes and reduce accountability (IdeA, 2006, p. 17). It is telling that 
Audit Scotland’s review found that CP had not reduced nor simplified the number of 
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local partnerships in Scotland, and in fact the ‘risk of increased bureaucracy and 
duplication of effort’ was growing in some areas (2006, para 85). 
 
 
Integration v Supplementation 
 
The Community Planning Implementation Group (CPIG) noted in its final report that 
the long-term success of CP requires that organisations adopt partnership working as 
an integral element of their everyday operation rather than something extra they must 
do (2004, p. iii). It is questionable how far this change of outlook has occurred: while 
CPPs have developed high-level strategic relationships they remain less integrated at 
the managerial and operational levels. For example, the shared vision each CPP must 
develop has not been incorporated into the strategies of each partner organisation 
(Spicker, nd). There is also relatively little evidence of Partnerships pooling budgets, 
sharing staff, standardising their reporting systems, joint procurement or common 
commissioning arrangements (Audit Scotland, 2006: para 35ff). There is also little 
evidence of any distinctive outcomes or added value from CP in terms of service 
users’ experiences; most analyses completed to date have focused mainly on the 
implementation processes involved in CP rather than its outputs or impacts (Audit 
Scotland, 2006: para 120).   
 
These failures in part reflect the operational circumstances of certain CPP members. 
Particular problems occur in the majority of CPPs where organisational members do 
not share common geographic boundaries. In such cases individual organisations must 
try to reflect and reconcile the potentially conflicting circumstances and priorities of 
Deleted: increasing 
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several different local community plans and strategies. For example, Strathclyde 
Passenger Transport and Strathclyde Police are both members of over a dozen 
different CPPs, so that senior management face difficulties in even ensuring there are 
sufficient staff to attend all the relevant CP meetings (including theme boards and 
local level CP within Partnerships) let alone co-ordinate the range of policy interests 
these generate (Scottish Parliament Audit Committee, 2007: para 58). Experience of 
partnership working in other policy areas and UK regions suggests that ‘co-
terminosity is the single most critical success’ factor (Goveas, 2006). 
  
The Scottish Executive has recognised that many CP members faced an inherent 
tension between prioritising local partnership working and continuing obligations to 
implement national policy directives and the agendas of their respective sponsoring 
government department (2007, p. 18). This dilemma is reinforced by funding systems 
and lines of accountability which direct organisations’ attention and interests upwards 
to central government rather than towards local concerns. National priorities do not 
necessarily correspond with local conditions nor interests, which inevitably become 
compromised when any trade-off is required. In addition, relatively few CPPs have 
their own dedicated staff (Eglinton, 2002). Those staff which CPPs do have may only 
work part-time on CP, and remain accountable to their principal employer, i.e. in most 
cases the local authority. Previous experience of cross-cutting and partnership 
working has shown that staff performance appraisal and career development systems 
which do not emphasize nor reward joined-up working are unlikely to have much 




Engagement v Capacity 
 
The need for greater community involvement and participation in local policy making 
was identified as a priority in the CP Pathfinder report, and the subsequent statutory 
CP guidance stated that ‘effective and genuine engagement of communities is at the 
heart of’ the process (Rogers, et al. 2000; Scottish Executive, 2004c, p. 7). Optimistic 
interpretations of CP have argued that it offers an opportunity to significantly extend 
local participatory democracy by involving citizens at the beginning of decision 
making, developing genuine participation processes in place of traditional 
consultation, and employing innovative methods to involve local people in shaping 
policy (Carley, 2004). Advice and assistance has been provided to CPPs to facilitate 
this: the Scottish Centre for Regeneration (nd) has developed a ‘How To’ guide for 
community engagement in CPPs, a Community Empowerment Fund (subsequently 
the Community Voices Programme) was established to support community 
representatives participating in CPPs, and Communities Scotland developed National 
Standards for Community Engagement to assist Partnerships. 
  
Despite these measures, many CPPs and local authorities have found effective 
community engagement ‘a challenging part of the process’ where considerable 
progress is still required (Community Planning Implementation Group, 2004, p.5; 
Scottish Centre for Regeneration, 2005). Both the Scottish Council for Voluntary 
Organisations (SCVO) and the Poverty Alliance argue that relatively few community 
groups are familiar with CP or aware of their opportunities to influence local policy 
(Poverty Alliance, 2005, p. 2; SCVO, 2003). A significant barrier to effective 
participation faced by voluntary and community sector (VCS) representatives is the 
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alien culture and uncongenial style in which many public sector organisations 
continue to operate. Again, this is an experience shared by local partnerships 
throughout the UK: analyses of LSPs concluded that genuine community engagement 
requires partners to alter their normal ‘rules of engagement’ and amend policy making 
processes which are off-putting to those unfamiliar with them (Taylor, 2006, p.270). 
Like its Scottish counterpart, the Anti-Poverty Network Cymru (2006) found that 
local people were deterred from involvement in the Communities First programme by 
the failure to adapt organisational cultures and practices to something they felt 
comfortable with, and also more practical impediments, such as the opportunity costs 
of attending meetings and lack of childcare provision for VCS representatives (Welsh 
Assembly Government, 2006). 
 
Frustrations have been voiced by some public officials in CPPs and other partnerships 
that VCS representatives do not ‘speak with one voice’, retain an oppositional 
outsider identity, and are reluctant to accept shared responsibility for collective 
decisions (IdeA, 2006, p. 16). In response to this, and in the interests of quick and 
‘efficient’ decision-making, some CPPs are accused of minimising the effective 
influence of VCS representatives by involving them only after agendas have been set 
and imposing timetables which limit meaningful VCS impact (SURF, 2004, p. 2). 
  
One implication of the experience of CPPs and other local partnerships is that it may 
be necessary to reconsider what can be realistically expected from VCS 
representatives (Foley and Martin, 2000). Some official agencies may be expecting 
VCS participants to perform a role that they are neither able nor willing to undertake. 
Although public officials’ interest in streamlined and professional decision making is 
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understandable, it is unrealistic to expect VCS representatives always to speak 
decisively on behalf a diverse sector or to reconcile what may be conflicting ideas 
about ‘community’ interests. Officials engaged in CP must also accept that a 
legitimate role for VCS representatives is to challenge public sector organisations and 
hold them accountable to broader interests, and not regard this as irresponsibly 
‘rocking the boat’ (Taylor, 2007, p. 270). In addition, VCS participants in local 
partnerships often need practical support and investment in their capacity to 
participate (Ross and Osborne, 1999, p. 58). It is not only public officials who may be 
overstretched by the growth in local partnerships: involvement in CP places an 
additional burden on what are often untrained local volunteers (Sharp et al, 2004). 
VCS organisations involved in local partnerships also have to develop new 
consultation and accountability mechanisms within their sector to fulfil this role. This 
may require a level of capacity within the sector which many VCS organisations do 
not currently possess (IdeA, 2005). More fundamentally, it requires the VCS to 
consider what they regard as their relationship to public agencies and to each other, 
and confront their own dilemma of reconciling the opportunity for greater influence 
against their anxiety of losing autonomy and being incorporated into a role many have 
traditionally avoided (Craig et al, 2004). 
 
 
Central Control v Local Autonomy 
 
The operational problems experienced by CPPs in part reflect long-standing tensions 
in relations between central and local government. Like LSPs in England (Darlow et 
al, 2007), Scottish CPPs have criticised central government for a persistent ‘silo 
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mentality’ in which government departments continue to treat CP organisations as 
separate entities rather than recognise their partnership obligations; for example, 
through issuing conflicting instructions to different local public agencies, or placing 
restrictions on the use of funding (Scottish Parliament Audit Committee, 2007, paras 
8, 15, 18). The degree of freedom and de-centralisation versus regulation and 
centralisation which central government accords local government and other public 
service providers expresses the level of trust and confidence between them (Centre for 
Scottish Public Policy, 2005). New Labour’s position on this spectrum is ambiguous 
and ‘highlights a deep-seated tension between national prescription and local 
flexibility’ (Foley and Martin, 2000. p.487). The result is an uneasy circumscribed 
and conditional autonomy for local policy makers, where central government 
expresses the desire to increase local decision-making while simultaneously imposing 
a performance and inspection regime which restricts local freedom of action (Johnson 
and Osborne, 2003). This is also exemplified by central government in England 
devolving control of certain services to the local level but restricting local authorities’ 
influence over these, as for example through trust schools and foundation hospitals. 
This dualism is also an implicit attraction in the current enthusiasm for ‘double 
devolution’ and ‘new localism’ to levels of governance below local authority control 
(Hilder, 2006). Neither of these tendencies have been pursued as vigorously in 
Scotland, but local government and public agencies have not completely escaped New 
Labour’s ‘control freakery and faith in managerialism to improve the delivery of 
public services’, as shown by the slower development of general outcome agreements 
for local services in comparison to England, despite strong lobbying from local 
authorities (Kelly, 2007, p. 328; COSLA, nd; SOLACE, nd).  
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A growing body of evidence from both formal evaluations and the practical 
experience of those working in local partnerships and delivering services 
demonstrates that the public sector performance culture extended by the Labour 
government has created its own inefficiencies and dysfunctions (Bound and 
Skidmore, 2005). In partial acknowledgement of this, a common theme in more recent 
policy statements from governments in all UK nations is recognition that more 
efficient outcomes may be achieved through less central control, and that future 
performance improvement initiatives should devolve more decision-making to local 
providers (e.g. Welsh Assembly Government, 2006, para 1.3.3). For example, the 
previous Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government in England stated 
that central government ‘must have the courage at the centre to let go. The challenges 
we face are too complex, the needs often too local, for all solutions to be imposed 
from the centre’ (DCLG, 2006, p. 4). Proposals for ‘lighter touch’ Comprehensive 
Area Assessments in place of CPAs, and fewer Best Value Performance Indicators are 
expressions of this incipient development. In Scotland, the dysfunctions and perverse 
outcomes of a restrictive performance culture have been recognised by the Scottish 
Executive in the establishment of an Independent Review of Scrutiny to examine 
reporting requirements and ‘ensure all scrutiny is streamlined and proportionate’ 
(Scottish Executive, nd).  
 
The evaluation of the local government modernisation agenda in England concluded 
that in order to further improve performance among local authorities, central 
government had to allow them greater freedom for innovation (Martin and Bovaird, 
2005). This lesson applies equally to the relationship between the Scottish Executive 
and CPPs. The dilemmas faced by CPPs will not be resolved by directives from 
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central government, as they are in part a manifestation of the limits of central control, 
as currently exercised. Rather, the optimal accommodation of the competing demands 
CPPs juggle is more likely to be accomplished through practical experience and 
‘learning-by-doing’ (Carley, 2005, p. 55). According to Communities Scotland, 
‘Scottish local authorities and their partners have become a national learning network 
on better governance and participation’; and, as there is no single best method of 
implementation, CP should be ‘a process of experimentation.’ (Carley, 2004, p.v, 26). 
The eventual outcome from this might be a mosaic of different partnerships, ranging 
from consultative co-ordination to full incorporation, depending on local 
circumstances. The Scottish Executive intimated a potential movement in this 
direction in its response to the Scottish Parliament’s inquiry into CP (Scottish 
Executive, 2007, p. 4). 
 
However, the practical and political limit to greater ‘earned autonomy’ for local 
authorities and partnerships is how far central government is prepared to allow 
autonomy and innovation to run the risk of failure. As Foley and Martin (2000. p. 
487) point out: 
 
the encouragement of innovation and experimentation may well be set 
on a collision course with the strong centralising instinct that lies at the 
heart of New Labour. Certainly increased local discretion is not easily 
reconciled with ‘zero tolerance of failure’. 
 
Oversight and intervention to address inadequate performance or service standards is 
a legitimate responsibility of central government, and in fact a statutory duty in some 
cases. Consequently, responding to some of the practical difficulties encountered in 
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local partnership working by granting greater local autonomy itself raises dilemmas 
and tensions. The boundaries of responsibility and relationships of authority between 
central and local government remain fluid  and ‘in a constant state of flux’ between 
opposing demands for central control versus local autonomy (Kelly, 2007, p. 325). CP 
in Scotland may have developed a different means to strike a balance between these 
tensions, but neither devolution nor the distinctive circumstances and political culture 





Four years after the legislation introducing statutory CP in Scottish local government 
was passed, and 10 years since the formation of the CP Working Group, a succession 
of analyses have concluded that it remains difficult to attribute any discernible 
impacts to CP: it remains a process and method of working rather than a tangible set 
of outcomes (Audit Scotland, 2006). 
 
These processes and experiences are broadly similar to those encountered in local 
governance reform and partnership development elsewhere in the UK. This is not 
surprising as CP reflects both circumstances and ideologies of reform which cross the 
borders of the different UK nations. Not least among these shared circumstances and 
pressures to convergence has been that the same political party was in office in each 
administration, albeit in coalition in Scotland until 2007. Consequently, CPPs in 
Scotland have been confronted with the same ‘fundamental tensions’ and ‘paradoxical 
processes’ of partnership working to those faced in developing community strategies 
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and LSPs in England (Darlow, et al, 2007’, p. 127; Johnson and Osborne, 2003, p. 
153).  
 
CP is a multi-purpose policy, central to the Scottish Executive’s reform of local 
government, its local service delivery improvement measures, attempts to reduce the 
local ‘democratic deficit’ through increased community participation, and its 
neighbourhood regeneration and social inclusion strategies (Poverty Alliance, 2005, p. 
8). In fact, rather too much may be riding on CP, and its future success will be 
influenced as much by developments across this wider reform agenda as by any 
factors intrinsic to CP itself. Cowell  (2004, p. 503) suggests that ‘it remains to be 
seen that aligning national and local priorities, closer intersectoral collaboration and 
greater public involvement are comfortable bedfellows’. It appears that they are not, 
and that CPPs face dilemmas between these competing duties. These are dealt with by 
prioritising one element over its rival or by operating both at a sub-optimal level. 
Consequently, either inefficiencies or disappointed expectations are inevitable in CP, 
as currently constituted. 
 
While CP and local governance reform in Scotland have been developed and 
implemented in a spirit of cooperation between central and local government, this has 
not itself resolved these dilemmas. Devolution also did not itself significantly shape 
the development and experience of CP in Scotland; the main differences, such as they 
are, have been largely attributable to the distinctive culture and institutional context 
which existed prior to 1999. 
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The future of CP and local governance reform in Scotland will be determined 
fundamentally by the consequences of the Scottish elections in May 2007, which 
resulted in the election for the first time in history of the Scottish National Party 
(SNP) to government, albeit as a minority administration. The freedom of action of 
the new Scottish Government as it insists on being called (rather than Executive), is 
significantly limited by its minority status. It appears likely to maintain CP rather than 
undertake large scale reorganisation; not least because the implications of both the 
2003 LGiS Act and 2004 Local Governance in Scotland Act (which introduced the 
Single Transferable Vote system for local elections and increased the number of 
coalition authorities) are still being dealt with.  
 
The importance of the Scottish central government’s position and of Scottish-UK 
inter-governmental relations to the future of local governance reform demonstrates the 
extent to which local institutions and policies are shaped by national elections and 
politics. In this sense, ‘community’ planning is as much a product of central as of 
local government, and the dilemmas faced by CPPs in Scotland and similar reforms 
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